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McNally Revisited: 
The "Misrepresentation Branch" of the Mail Fraud 
Statute a Decade Later· 
"To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute 
is our Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our 
Cuisinart--and our true love. We may flirt with RICO, show off with 
/Ob-5, and call the conspiracy law 'darling', but we always come home 
to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, with its simplicity, adaptability and 
comfortable familiarity. It understands us and, like many a foolish 
spouse, we like to think we understand it." 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If conspiracy is indeed the darling of the prosecutor's nursery,2 then 
mail fraud must surely be its younger sibling. The mail fraud statute has 
been used extensively to prosecute a multitude of criminal activities. 3 Of-
ten, the applicability of the mail fraud statute is dependant only upon the 
prosecutor's creativity.4 When coupled with the nearly Draconian penal-
ties of RIC0,5 the mail fraud statute becomes a formidable weapon in the 
prosecutor's arsenal. However, due to consistently mistaken statutory 
construction and fundamental shifts in the Supreme Court's stance to-
ward the breadth of the mail fraud statute, confusion abounds about 
which activities are punishable for mail fraud, and specifically, what ele-
ments constitute the offense of mail fraud. Nowhere is this uncertainty 
more evident than in questions concerning the meaning of the statute's 
misrepresentation clause. 
* Copyright© 1998 by Christopher Q. Cutler. 
I. Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1}, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 
(1980). 
2. Judge Learned Hand first memorialized this mantra of prosecutors in Harrison v. United 
States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925) ("conspiracy, that darling of the modem prosecutor's 
nursery"). 
3. At one point, courts described the extent of the mail fraud statute, and its twin, the wire 
fraud statute, as "seemingly limitless." United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981) (noting also that "[t]he absence of legislative guidance 
has left the courts with broad discretion to apply the mail fraud statute to the myriad of fraudulent 
schemes devised by unscrupulous entrepreneurs"). !d. at I 005. 
4. Mail fraud has been referred to as a "first line of defense" to new forms of fraud that 
are otherwise not conveniently prosecutable. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
5. Under RICO, mail fraud may be punished by up to twenty years imprisonment and 
significant forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963. Civil remedies are also available under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1964. One study suggests that 57% of all civil RICO claims are predicated on mail or wire 
fraud. Brad D. Brian, Predicate Acts of Mail and Wire Fraud, 141 PLI/Crim 79 (1986). 
77 
78 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
Mail fraud, as history shows, has evolved significantly over time. 
Prior to 1909, the mail fraud statute was only implemented to prosecute 
"a scheme or artifice to defraud."6 However, the statutory language was 
later amended to include the misrepresentation clause, which prohibits 
"obtaining property or money through fraudulent pretenses, representa-
tions, or promises."7 The interplay between these two clauses has become 
a compelling area of jurisprudence and an influential guide to federal 
prosecutors. 
Interpretation of the misrepresentation clause has evolved through 
three separate stages: (1) the Pre-Durland period of statutory purity; (2) 
the Durland mandated period of clearly separated clauses; and (3) Post-
McNally confusion. Throughout these transitions, application of the statu-
tory prohibition against "obtaining property or money through fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises" has undergone a distinct matura-
tion.8 
This article analyzes the misrepresentation clause, principally by 
comparing judicial decisions and examining statutory construction. Part II 
focuses on the evolution of the mail fraud statute, from its historical im-
petus in the mid-1800s to the seminal McNally case in 1987. Important 
developments from both the courtroom and the halls of Congress are ana-
lyzed circumspectly. Part III studies the McNally decision and its immedi-
ate impact on interpretation of the misrepresentation clause, including 
Congressional reaction. Against this background, Part IV examines post-
McNally prosecutions in their attempt to define the connection between 
the scheme-to-defraud and misrepresentation clauses. Finally, Part V is 
designed to serve as a pragmatic guide to future mail fraud jurisprudence, 
arguing that the two mail fraud clauses ought to be treated as independent 
prosecutorial alternatives. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE 
A. Original Statutory Construction and Judicial Response 
The mail fraud statute has a long and colorful history in American 
jurisprudence. First instituted in 1872 as a portion of the recodified postal 
laws, the mail fraud statute has primarily served as a means of preventing 
the imposition of fraud on the postal system. Originally, the mail fraud 
statute proscribed anyone from "devis[ing] or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, or be effected by either opening or intend-
6. See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323; Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, 
§ 5480, 25 Stat. 873. 
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
8. !d. 
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ing to open correspondence or communication with any other person ... 
by means of the post-office establishment" and punished as a misde-
meanor any such act.9 The purpose of this statute, as enunciated by the 
sponsor of the broad postal revisions, was "to prevent the frauds which 
are mostly gotten up in the large cities ... by thieves, forgers, and rap-
scallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent 
people in the country." 10 When the validity of the recodified postal laws 
was first challenged in 1878, the Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of the statutes, finding that Congress' power to "establish post of-
fices and post roads"" included the right to regulate all functions of the 
postal industry. 12 The Court concluded that the "right to designate what 
shall be carried necessarily involves the right to determine what shall be 
excluded." 13 
Mail fraud, as created, was not a mere codification of the common 
Jaw. While the common law initially resisted creation of a criminal of-
fense of fraud, 14 courts later permitted it. 15 As originally constituted, the 
mail fraud statute did not contain language reflecting common law fraud-
ulent offenses such as that of common law cheat or deceit. 16 And even 
though mail fraud was not entirely the product of statutory construction, 
due to the unique addition of the requirement of the use of the mails, it 
was nearly interpreted as such. Understandably, a degree of confusion 
arose within the legal community as to how to treat this creature of the 
law. 
Subsequent case law more clearly delineated the power to regulate 
fraud through the mail. In United States v. Loring, 17 a federal district 
court elaborated on the species of fraud sufficient to support a conviction 
of mail fraud. The court noted that "the scheme or artifice to defraud ... 
should be so fully stated as to enable the court to see, as a matter of law, 
that, if consummated, a fraud would be perpetrated." 18 However, the 
court felt that "it need not ... be a fraud either at common law or by stat-
9. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323 (emphasis added). 
10. McNally v. United States 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (quoting Remarks of Representative 
John Franklin Farnsworth of Illinois, CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Scss. 35 (1870)). 
II. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
12. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877). 
13. !d. This reasoning upheld the constitutionality of the mail fraud statute as an integral 
portion of the recodified postal laws. See United States v. Loring, 91 F. 881, 882 (D Ill. 1884). 
14. For example, in Ref?ina v. Jones it was stated that "we are not to indict one for making 
a fool of another." 91 Eng. Rep. 330 (1703). 
15. For a comparison between mail fraud and common law offenses see Courtney Chetty 
Genco, What Happened to Durland?: Mail Fraud, Rico, and Justifiable Reliance. 68 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 333, 337-57 (1992). 
16. See generally id. 
17. 91 F. 881 (D. Ill. 1884) 
18. !d. at 884-85. 
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ute. It was enough if it was a scheme or purpose to defraud any persons of 
their money." 19 This language reflected the popular sentiment of the 
time-an emphasis on the "scheme to defraud," not an exact devotion to 
the common law.20 Thus mail fraud became largely a creature of statute, 
warily enabled only to prevent those frauds perpetrated pursuant to a 
scheme.21 
Loring represented an adherence to the statutory language and a care-
ful view of the statute. Courts were reluctant to expand the extent of the 
statute during this period.22 While some argument can be made that sev-
eral courts took a much more expansive view of the statute,23 as a general 
rule courts confined themselves to the limits of the statutory language in 
defining which activities could be prosecuted as mail fraud. 24 In 1896, 
however, the Supreme Court in Durland v. United States25 broadened the 
legal analysis of the statute and effectively gave birth to what would soon 
become another favorite in the prosecutor's nursery. 
19. !d. at 887. 
20. See. e.g., United States v. Owens, 17 F. 72, 74 (E.D. Mo. 1883) (recognizing a 
difference between mail fraud and "state statutes or a common law" and interpreting the statute 
by its plain language). 
21. See generally Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S. 187, 188-89 (1895). Stokes deliniated 
the three distinct elements of mail fraud under the particular version of the statute then in effect: 
(I) that the persons charged must have devised a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) that 
they must have intended this scheme by opening or intending to open correspondence 
with some other person through the post office establishment, or by inciting such other 
person to open communication with them; (3) and that, in carrying out such scheme, 
such person must have either deposited a letter or packet in the post office, or taken 
or receive one therefrom. 
/d. This statute-based framework reflected the contours of mail fraud prosecution at that time, 
circumspectly allowing those crimes to be prosecuted that clearly fell within the statutory range. 
See id. 
22. See. e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1361 (4th Cir. 1979) (noting that 
early cases attempted to "severely limit the term scheme to defraud"). 
23. For example, some commentators feel that two competing schools of thought existed, 
a "broad constructionist" and "strict constructionist" school. See Genco, supra note 15. While this 
characterization may be correct in some contexts (as in the debate among the courts during that 
time as to the necessity of a mailing), I remain unconvinced that it is more valid than the one 
presented in this paper when applied to the substantive crimes that were prosecuted at that time. 
24. See generally United States v. Long, 68 F. 348, 350 (S.D. Cal. 1895) (rejecting an 
indictment that did not accurately mirror the statutory scheme); United States v. Beach, 71 F. 160, 
161 (D. Colo. 1895) (recognizing that "the statute is not limited to the particular deceits mentioned 
in it," but limited to those generally regarded as a scheme or artifice to defraud); United States v. 
Smith, 45 F. 561, 563 (E. D. Wis. 1891) (noting that while the language of the statute may not 
accurately represent the intent of Congress, "ita lex scripta est, and it must be administered as 
declared"); United States v. Mitchell, 36 F. 492, 493 (W.O. Penn. 1888) (finding that "[w]hatever 
is not plainly within its provision shall be regarded as without its intendment"). 
25. 161 U.S. 306 (1896). 
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B. Creation of the Misrepresentation Clause 
1. Durland v. United States: Genesis of the misrepresentation clause 
In 1889, Congress amended the mail fraud statute for the first time, 
an action that both enlarged the scope of the statute and specified behav-
ior prohibited by the enactment. Congress declared that mail fraud could 
be committed by 
any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice 
to defraud, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, or 
distribute, supply, or furnish, or procure of unlawful use ... or anything 
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spu-
rious articles, or any scheme or artifice to obtain money by or through 
correspondence.26 
A few years later, Durland v. United States gave the Supreme Court its 
first opportunity to clarify exactly what behavior constituted mail fraud 
under the amended statute. 27 
In Durland, the defendant argued that the mail fraud statute should 
only prohibit activities actionable under common-law fraud cases that 
"would come within the definition of 'false pretenses,' in order to make 
out which there must be a misrepresentation as to some existing fact."28 
The Supreme Court disagreed with this characterization of the statute. 
Prophetically recognizing the future of mail fraud prosecution, the Court 
held that "[t]he statute is broader than is claimed. Its letter shows this: 
'Any scheme or artifice to defraud.' Some schemes may be promoted 
through mere representations and promises as to the future, yet are none 
the less schemes and artifices to defraud."29 The Supreme Court, for the 
first time, acknowledged the breadth of the statute, with resulting bound-
aries not confined by previous statutory interpretation. Any other reading 
of the statute, under the Court's reasoning, would prevent the government 
from protecting the public against the various frauds propagated through 
the mail. The following explanatory language proved to be the guiding 
ensign of mail fraud jurisprudence for some time to come: 
26. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873 (emphasis added). This section 
specifically prohibits dealing in "sawdust swindle," "counterfeit money fraud," "green articles," 
"green coin," "bills," "paper goods," "Spurious Treasury notes," "United States goods," "green 
cigars," and other misbegotten articles. ld. Subsequent revisions abrogated such specific language, 
replacing it with the current "counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security or other article, or 
anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article." 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1997). 
27. 161 U.S. at 306. 
28. ld. at 312. 
29. fd. at 313. 
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It was with the purpose of protecting the public against all such inten-
tional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post office from being used 
to carry them into effect, that this statute was passed; and it would strip 
it of value to confine it to such cases as disclose an actual misrepresen-
tation as to some existing fact, and exclude those in which is only the 
allurement of a specious and glittering promise?11 
Understandably, federal prosecutors reveled in the unprecedented 
breadth Durland promised; this sentiment echoed throughout the prosecu-
tions of the next century. Mail fraud became more than just a traditional 
fraud; it evolved into a spectrum of fraudulent activity, with only the pros-
ecutor's creative characterization of the statutory language delimitating 
the boundaries of the offense. 31 For the first time the courts recognized an 
element of misrepresentation32 to be present in mail fraud, though this 
element was not a dispositive factor. Curiously, mail fraud became a stat-
utory creature that not only devoured its legislative mandate in whole, it 
became a precocious duel entity -- the new sweetheart of the prosecutor's 
nursery, yet a ravenous and sanguine monster, roaming freely through the 
legal landscape. 
In 1909, Congress added to the mail fraud statute a prohibition that 
included future misrepresentations, thereby codifying the holding in 
Durland.33 Indeed, the legislature specifically emphasized the Durland 
decision by adding the phrase "or obtaining money or property by means 
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."34 In 1948, 
Congress fine-tuned the mail fraud statute, eliminating superfluities. That 
30. !d. at 314. 
31. See generally Horman v. United States, 116 F. 350, 351-52 (6th Cir. 1902), cert. 
denied, 187 U.S. 641 (1902) (recognizing that the intent and purpose of those committing mail 
fraud outweighed statutory reliance on a technical definition of a scheme or artifice to defraud). 
32. Recapitulating what the federal courts have said, misrepresentation has been defined as: 
a statement or an assertion which concerns a material or important aspect of the matter 
in question and that was known to be untrue at the time it was made or used, or that 
was made or used with reckless indifference as to whether it was, in fact, true or false, 
and made or used with the intent to defraud .... The term ... includes actual, direct 
false statements as well as half-truths, and includes the knowing concealment of facts 
that are material or important to the matter in question and that were made or used with 
the intent to defraud. 
2 EDWARD J. DEvm ET AL., FEDERAL JuRY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, §40.13, at 521 (4th ed. 
1990). For a substantive discussion of the differences between these two clauses in modern 
jurisprudence see United States v. Goldburg, 913 F. Supp. 629, 637-38 (D. Mass 1996). 
33. Congress, however, did not extend the mail fraud statute to the full breadth the Court 
had implied it should be in Durland. Apparently, the revision was more narrow than the 
"everything designed to defraud" language found in the Court's decision. See McNally v. Unites 
States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987). See also Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873. 
34. Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873. 
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version, in many respects, resembles the statute in effect today. 35 The 
omission of specific crimes such as dealing in "green articles" and "green 
cigars" was induced by the Supreme Court's willingness to look beyond 
the statutory language in an attempt to find the "evil sought to be reme-
died."36 
2. Legal ramifications of Durland 
From the revision of 1948 until 1987, the mail fraud statute changed 
little in form, 37 but prosecution under the statute evolved to meet chang-
ing prosecutorial concems.38 The Supreme Court in Durland had created 
an important new precedent, and Congress had codified it, apparently 
solidifying the expansive scope of the statute. In reality, the addition of a 
misrepresentation prohibition became the conduit for judicially broaden-
ing the mail fraud statute to govern crimes unanticipated prior to 
Durland. The Supreme Court had opened a Pandora's box with the addi-
tion of the misrepresentation proscription, freeing the judicial reins and 
allowing courts to broadly interpret the statute. Consequently, courts be-
came quite liberal, allowing prosecutors to employ the statute in a variety 
35. Act of June 25. 1948 ch. 645, 62 Stat. 763. The statute states: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or obtaining 
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises to 
sell, dispose or, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for 
unlawful purposes any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or 
anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, 
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so, places in any post 
office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or 
delivered by the Post Office Department, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or 
thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at 
the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed any 
such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both. 
!d. The an1endment notably also dismissed any requirement that the fraud "be effectuated by 
either opening or intending correspondence or communication ... [through] the post office." !d. 
36. Durland, 161 U.S. at 313. 
37. The statute was amended in 1949, yet this was only to correct a typographical error. 
Also. during this interim. the statute was recodified under its present number. See Historical and 
Statutory Notes to 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1997). 
38. "The general language in the mail fraud statute has repeatedly been construed to cover 
novel species of fraud .... [it] 'has been characterized as the first line of defense against virtually 
every new area of fraud to develop in the United States in the past century'" McNally v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 350, 374 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rakoff, supra note 1. at 772-
73) 
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of contexts.39 Not surprisingly, the statute soon became the first line of 
defense against new forms of fraud.40 
Yet, as the statute encompassed more and more area, it also became 
more and more defined. Courts began to differentiate between the origi-
nal scheme-to-defraud clause and the recently-added misrepresentation 
clause.41 Interpreting the misrepresentation and scheme-to-defraud 
clauses to constitute completely separate offenses, several courts held 
that a conviction would be upheld if based on either clause.42 Specifi-
cally, courts found 
several alternatives in which the mail fraud offense may be 
committed, ... [including] (I) a scheme or artifice to defraud, and (2) 
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises. The activities proscribed by either of these 
clauses constitute independent grounds for conviction of mail fraud. 43 
Thus, "the defendant's activities [could] be a scheme or artifice to 
defraud whether or not specific misrepresentations [were] involved."44 In 
39. Recognizing that the statute was used to prosecute "novel and marginal forms of 
misconduct that have traditionally been viewed as involving only civil, ethical, or regulatory 
violations," it has been noted that the mail fraud statute has been employed in the prosecutions 
of "an attorney violating ethical rules .. a politician favoring the interests of his political 
cronies ... a union official arranging a 'sweetheart' labor contract ... [and] a sexually frustrated 
man seeking to seduce women by promising to place them in modeling and acting roles." OTIO 
G. 0BERMAJER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, White Collar Crime: Business and Regulatory Offenses 
§ 9.01, at 9-4 (1998). 
40. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating 
that "when a 'new' fraud develops-as constantly happens-the mail fraud statute becomes a 
stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until particularized 
legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil"). 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Frankel, 721 F.2d 917, 921 (3d Cir. 1983) (recognizing that 
the clauses should be read independently); McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 
1492, 1507 (D.N.J. 1985) (stating that "the statute discussed two separate types of maiVwire fraud 
offenses: one may act pursuant to a 'scheme of artifice to defraud' or one may act 'by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises'" and joining other courts that give the 
statute "such a disjunctive meaning"); Lemon v. United States, 278 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1960) 
(noting that a conviction under the first prong of the statute does not require a misrepresentation). 
42. Specifically, Frankel said that "[a]lthough the added clause was intended to identify 
and proscribe a particular course of conduct, it does not follow that the first and more general 
clause was restricted by the amendment." 721 F.2d 917, 920 (3d Cir. 1983). See also United States 
v. Scott, 701 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (lith Cir.) (clarifying the components of the statute), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 856 (1983); Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 138 (9th Cir. 1967) (noting 
that mail fraud requires no misrepresentation if there is a scheme to defraud); United States v. 
Classic, 35 F. Supp 457, 458 (E.D. La. 1940) (recognizing as separate the scheme or artifice to 
defraud and misrepresentation). 
43. United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. I 98 I) This court felt that 
ignoring the separate nature of both prongs "flies in the face of the language of 18 U.S. C. § 1341 , 
which specified several alternative ways in which the mail fraud offense may be committed." /d. 
44. !d. See also United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding the 
clauses to be independent), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 
579, 585 (5th Cir. 1982) (requiring no showing that statements be false, fraudulent on their face, 
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1987, however, the Supreme Court handed down McNally v. United 
States, 45 a case that strongly questioned the structural independence of the 
two clauses in the mail fraud statue. 
Ill. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: MCNALLY AND AN IDENTITY CRISIS FOR 
THIS DARLING OF THE NURSERY 
As the reach of the mail fraud statute extended into previously un-
foreseen realms, a specific and novel application of the statute developed 
that would set the stage for McNally v. United States, the first major 
reigning in of the roaming monster. Beginning with dicta in 1947,46 an 
"intangible rights theory" developed and soon enveloped all of the federal 
circuits.47 The intangible rights doctrine held that under the scheme-to-
defraud element of mail fraud, the fraud need not only affect tangible 
property rights, it may affect the "intangible right to the 'honest services' 
of public officials."48 This doctrine was predicated on the plain reading of 
the statute: the "scheme or artifice to defraud" language was independent, 
and separated by the disjunctive "or," from the "obtaining money or 
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses" language.49 As the 
two clauses of the statute were read independently, it was determined that 
the scheme to defraud need not involve the acquisition of money or prop-
erty. The fraudulent gains could be intangible.50 
Howard W. Hunt, an active Democrat in the state of Kentucky, was 
made the chairman of the state Democratic Party after the gubernatorial 
election of 1974. Consequently, Hunt was entrusted with the responsibil-
ity of selecting the insurance policies for state workers. Hunt contacted a 
certain insurance company that was eventually granted the contract for 
or mvolve a misrepresentation-all that is required is a scheme calculated to defraud others), cert. 
denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); United States v. Bruce, 488 F.2d 1224, 1229 (5th 1973) (same), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974); Fournier v. United States, 58 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1932) (requiring 
no misrepresentation for a scheme to defraud), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 565 (1932). 
45. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
46. "No trustee has more sacred duties than a public official and any scheme to obtain an 
advantage by corrupting such an one must in the federal law be considered a scheme to defraud." 
Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941). 
47. While the intangible rights doctrine may seem merely ancillary to the analysis of the 
misrepresentation clause, the Supreme Court's treatment of this doctrine set the stage for McNally's 
major reversal in the application of the mail fraud statute, specifically relating to the relationship 
between the separate clauses of the statute. 
48. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to 
Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 187-88 (1993). 
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
50. See generally United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 120 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that 
"[ f]radulent schemes designed to cause losses of an intangible nature clearly come within the terms 
of this statute"); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 
961 (1980); United States v. Rauhaff, 525 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1975) (upholding a conviction for 
defrauding the right of the public to Joyal and faithful service by state officials). 
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the workers' compensation policy, but included a stipulation that the 
company share any commissions in excess of $50,000 per year with other 
specified insurance companies. A company owned by Hunt with several 
other partners was one of those that received payments. Prosecutors 
charged Hunt and the other owners of the company with one count of 
conspiracy and seven counts of mail fraud. The prosecution based its case 
on the fact that the defendants had "devised a scheme ... to defraud the 
citizens and government of Kentucky of their right to have the Common-
wealth's affairs conducted honestly."51 The trial court convicted the de-
fendants on the conspiracy and mail fraud charges. 52 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, finding 
support in the "line of decisions from the Courts of Appeals holding that 
the mail fraud statute proscribes schemes to defraud citizens of their in-
tangible rights to honest and impartial government."53 The Supreme 
Court, however, reversed these convictions, delivering what it perceived 
to be the death knell to widespread use of the intangible rights doctrine, 
by limiting the doctrine to cases where an economic loss accompanies the 
loss of honest governmental services. The mail fraud statute, it reasoned, 
protects property rights "but does not refer to the intangible right of the 
citizenry to good government."54 
Justice White, writing for the majority, found that while Durland had 
recognized broad applicability of the statute, this applicability extended 
only to property rights. Durland had spoken as to "everything designed to 
defraud by representations," but Congress had nevertheless subsequently 
reciprocated with "[any scheme or artifice] for obtaining money or prop-
erty."55 In essence, while broadening the scope of the statute, Congress 
had created a more limited standard than intimated under Durland. Thus, 
fraudulent representation became conditioned upon the defrauding of real 
property. While the majority recognized that the separate clauses of 
scheme to defraud and misrepresentation appear in the disjunctive in the 
statute, and thus arguably could be construed independently, it found lan-
guage in earlier cases equating fraud with tangible fraud to be more per-
51. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 353 (1987). 
52. See id. 
53. /d. at 355. 
54. /d. at 356. 
55. /d. at 357. 
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suasive. 56 The majority held that the first prong of the mail fraud statute 
is tempered and effectually conditioned by the second prong. 
The majority's analysis of the two elements of the mail fraud statute 
is compelling because the majority interposes a confusing constructive 
juxtaposition. The statutory clauses are mutually exclusive, yet interde-
pendent. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, persuasively critiqued this obfus-
cated analysis. 
Justice Stevens recognized three different prohibitions advanced by 
the mail fraud statute: ( 1) scheme to defraud, (2) false pretenses (misrep-
resentation), and (3) counterfeiting.57 To demonstrate the independence 
of each clause, he noted that a violation of one element does not necessar-
ily constitute a violation of any of the others. Yet in its opinion, the ma-
jority had sought to apply the first clause in a context defined by the sec-
ond. Stevens accused the majority of "show[ing] no fidelity to Congress' 
words or purpose" by intermingling the separate clauses. 58 He noted that, 
in essence, the majority had construed the "false pretenses" phrase as 
only "modifying the original prohibition."59 Justice Stevens compared the 
statutory language to the judicial definitions of fraud the majority had 
presented, and astutely recognized that the case relied upon by the major-
ity had held that to prove a conspiracy to defraud "[i]t is not necessary 
that the Government shall be subjected to property loss by the fraud, but 
only that its legitimate official action and purpose shall be defeated by 
misrepresentation, chicane, or the overreaching of those charged with 
carrying out the governmental intention."6° Clearly, Justice Stevens felt 
that the majority had significantly muddied the waters as to the activities 
that constitute mail fraud. Also, the majority had proved itself an infidel 
to the common weight of authority among the federal circuits.61 He omi-
nously concluded his dissent by predicting that "[i]n the long run, it is not 
clear how grave the ramifications of today' s decision may be."62 
56. See id. at 358. The Court specifically cited language from Hammerschmidt v. United 
States, that interpreted "to defraud" to mean "wronging one in his property rights by dishonest 
methods or schemes." 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924). Hammerschmidt was a case involving conspiracy 
to resist regulations requiring registration for selective service and was not prosecuted under the 
mail fraud statute. The dissent felt the applicability of Hammerschmidt to be inapposite in the 
context of mail fraud. Additionally, the dissent notes that Hammerschmidt "itself goes on to 
expressly reject the notion that fraud is limited to interference with monetary or property rights." 
McNally, 483 U.S at 369 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
57. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 364-65. 
58. /d. at 366. 
59. /d. at 373. 
60. Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188 (emphasis added). 
61. Justice Stevens felt that McNally went against the prior judicial decisions and violated 
the venerable tenet that "it is the common opinion, and communis opinio is of good authority in 
law." Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805, 818 (1998) (Stevens, J,. dissenting). 
62. McNally, 483 U.S. at 377. In a subsequent case decided that same term. the Court 
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In response to McNally and its progeny,63 Congress amended the mail 
fraud statute to its present form. The present statute was intended to 
trump McNally-the Court had challenged Congress to speak more 
clearly if it wished to extend the mail fraud statute,64 so Congress met this 
challenge.65 Consequently, the mail fraud statute now embraces the intan-
gible rights theory through 18 U.C.A. § 1346.66 The amendment broad-
ened the statutory language to reflect pre-McNally law among federal 
courts that subscribed to the intangible rights doctrine.67 Once again, the 
sibling sweetheart of the prosecutor's nursery can rein in the activities of 
corrupt politicians.68 However, the lingering effects of McNally continue 
to fester in the federal courts.69 
IV. POST-MCNAUY 
In the decade since McNally, a multitude of courts have played the 
judicial soothsayer, attempting to divine from the cryptic harbingers of 
the high Court and the Congress what fate has befallen the mail fraud 
found that a property right existed in keeping information at a newspaper confidential until 
publication. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (!987) (reasoning that confidential 
business information was not comparable to an intangible right to impartial government). 
Commentators have felt that these two decisions seem inconsistent. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley. 
Mail Fraud Ajier McNally and Carpenter: The Essence of Fraud, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
573 (1988). 
63. The reasoning of the court in McNally was subsequently mirrored in several lower 
federal court cases. See, e.g., United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65, 70-72 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding 
that McNally prohibited mail fraud convictions for deprivation of information concerning breaches 
of fiduciary duty); United States v. Baldinger. 838 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding an indictment 
couched solely in terms of the intangible rights doctrine improper after McNally). 
64. "If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more clearly than this." McNally. 483 
U.S. at 360. 
65. The refusal to "accept the widely held view of lower courts about the scope of fraud 
was quickly corrected by the !DOth Congress." West Va. Univ. Hosp .. Inc. v. Casey, 499 US. 83. 
114-15 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
66. To mitigate judicial erosion of mail fraud through McNally, in 1988 Congress created 
18 U.S.C. § 1346 which reads: "For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to 
defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." 
/d. See State v. Davis, 873 F.2d 900, 902 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that Congress incorporated the 
intangible rights doctrine into § 1346) .. cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923 (!989); United States v. Frost. 
125 F.3d 346, 364 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that "§ 1346 has restored the mail fraud statute to its 
pre-McNally scope, according to its previous opinions interpreting the intangible right to honest 
services"). 
67. The recent amendments also have broadened the statute significantly in other areas. For 
example, the statute now protects against fraud that is delivered by mail "or other such carrier." 
18 U.S.C. § 1346. 
68. See United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 732-35 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that a 
Regional Director of Texas Worker's Compensation Commission could be found violating the 
public right to honest services). 
69. See United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1434-40 (acknowledging that § 1346 did 
not entirely eviscerate McNally). 
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statute. McNally sent shock waves throughout the legal community .70 
Many subsequent cases have dealt with specific procedural issues raised 
by McNally. 71 Substantively, it appears that McNally has profoundly con-
fused mail fraud jurisprudence. McNally has come to stand for two gen-
eral propositions: (1) the jurisdiction of the mail fraud statute is not un-
limited, and yet (2) the Court may reject the pre-Durland devotion to the 
statutory language completely. While the first proposition seems to be the 
most egregiously demanding of prosecutorial concern, the second may 
prove to be the most problematic. Conceivably, the Court has created a 
situation where the first prong of the statute is so conditioned by the sec-
ond that every mail fraud must involve a misrepresentation. Also, the 
Court may have developed a scheme that reverses Durland, obviating the 
second prong completely. Only through a careful canvass of recent case-
law do the true ramifications of McNally on the misrepresentation clause 
become apparent, and while unsure of many aspects of the relationship 
between McNally and § 1346, courts have unfailingly adhered to Justice 
Stevens' distinct clause analysis. 
United States v. Cooper72 provides a crystalized expose of the strict 
adherence to statutory independence. Not long after the Supreme Court 
delivered the McNally decision, two defendants were charged with wire 
fraud and, on the basis of McNally, requested that the jury be instructed 
on both clauses of the statute conjointly rather than in the alternative.73 
Specifically, the defendant requested that the jury be advised that mail 
fraud requires "(1) a scheme or plan to defraud of property or money, (2) 
to obtain by false pretenses, and (3) the use of the wire in furtherance 
thereof."74 This request, clearly relying on McNally, sought to completely 
ignore the disjunctive between the scheme-to-defraud and misrepresenta-
tion clauses. The district court rejected this argument, finding that the 
statutory interpretation in McNally only required that the former clause 
involve the loss of "money or property,"75 not that the latter also involve 
70. The McNally decision "has been variously described as 'blockbusting,' as a 'total 
surprise,' as a 'wholly unexpected application of the law of mail fraud.'" United States v. Ochs, 
842 F.2d 515, 521 (1st Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). 
71. Many cases, for example, have dealt with the retroactivity of McNally. Some courts have 
overturned convictions due to the McNally decision. See, e.g., United States v. Arrington, 867 F.2d 
122 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989); United States v. Mitchell, 867 F.2d 1232 (9th 
Cir. 1989). Other courts, however, have distinguished McNally and allowed convictions to stand. 
See, e.g., United States v. Utz, 886 F.2d 1148 (9th 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990); 
O'Leary v. United States, 856 F.2d 1142 (8th Cir. 1988); Belt v. United States, 868 F.2d 1208 
(lith Cir. 1988). 
72. 677 F. Supp. 778 (D. Del. 1988). 
73. The wire fraud statute is interpreted "in pari materia" with the mail fraud statute. United 
States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d 941, 944 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1032 (1981). 
74. Cooper, 677 F. Supp. at 780. 
75. /d. 
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a scheme to defraud.76 The court found that intermingling the two phrases 
in such a manner "would be to rewrite the clear language of the statute 
and to undercut the intended purpose of its second phrase. That purpose, 
as we have seen, is to prohibit schemes ... that don't fall within the tradi-
tional definitions of fraud."77 The court in this instance intentionally re-
sisted a "further narrowing" of the statute in order to fulfill the intent of 
the statute. 78 
The Cooper decision has been consistently reflected throughout sub-
sequent judicial decisions. Courts have noted that while the clauses are 
"overlapping" at times, they do nevertheless constitute separate ele-
ments.79 The main difference between the two clauses is that the scheme 
to defraud "focuses on the end result ... [and] the scheme to obtain 
money by means of false or fraudulent pretenses . . . focuses on the 
means by which the money was obtained."8° Courts have not intermingled 
the two statutory provisions, and have required separate evidence for the 
two offenses.81 Generally, the courts have held that the "elements of mail 
fraud remain unchanged" after McNally. 82 Thus, Justice Stevens' inti-
mated fears that the two prongs of the statute would become indistin-
guishable were misplaced. Courts have not retreated from the pre-
McNally separate prong analysis, and the ruling of McNally has been con-
fined to have substantially affected only the intangible rights doctrine, 
and that of course only temporarily. 83 
Further support for the distinction between the two clauses can be 
found in the model jury instructions given by the federal courts. The in-
structions for the federal circuits effectively mirror the case law that has 
76. The court specifically stated that the second clause "is self-explanatory and should be 
interpreted as written-the obtaining by the misrepresentor, not the loss by the person defrauded, 
is the gist of the second phrase." /d. 
77. !d. 
78. !d. 
79. See United States v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1514 (lOth Cir. 1990) (finding that the two 
clauses, while overlapping in the substantive crimes that they prohibit, constitute different offenses). 
While Cronic was a case involving the bank fraud statute, "[t]he mail ... fraud [statute makes] 
the same distinction as [the bank fraud statute] between schemes to defraud and schemes to obtain 
property by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises." United States v. Bonnett, 
877 F.2d 1450, 1454 (I Oth Cir. 1989). 
80. Cronic, 900 F.2d at 1513-14. Consequently, the tirst offense docs not require an 
afftrmative misrepresentation, while the second is predicated on a misrepresentation. See id., see 
also United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1162 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S 994 (1989) 
(finding that mail fraud does not only implicate "schemes that involve false promises and 
misrepresentations") (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359 ( 1987)). 
81. See United States v. Fontana, 948 F.2d 796, 801 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that while the 
prosecution indicted on both prongs of the statute, and the jury was instructed similarly, the 
prosecution did not have to prove a misrepresentation under both prongs). 
82. United States v. Lew, 875 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir. 1989). 
83. See United States v. Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1440 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that McNally 
has essentially been nullified by § 1346, yet some of its influence remains). 
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maintained the distinction between the two clauses. For example, the 
model jury instruction for the Eighth Circuit provides: 
The crime of mail fraud, as charged in (Count _ of) the indictment, 
has four essential clements, which are: 
One, the defendant voluntarily and intentionally (devised or made up a 
scheme to defraud another out of (money, property or property rights) 
(the intangible right to honest services)) (participated in a scheme to 
defraud with knowledge of its fraudulent nature) (devised or partici-
pated in a scheme to obtain (money, property or property rights) (the 
intangible right to honest services) by means of false representations or 
promises) (which scheme is described as follows: (describe scheme in 
summary form or in manner charged in the indictment) ); 
Two, the defendant did so with the intent to defraud; 
Three, it was reasonably foreseeable that the mails would be used; and 
Four, the mails were used in furtherance of some essential step in the 
scheme.x4 
This instruction clearly establishes the ability to prosecute under either, 
or both, clauses of the mail fraud statute. While this seems to be the con-
sensus among the jurisdictions, the Fifth Circuit's model jury instruction 
differs slightly. It requires that: 
For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime (18 U.S.C.A. 1341 ), 
you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the fol-
lowing beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First: That the defendant knowingly created a scheme to defraud, that is 
___ (describe scheme from the indictment); 
Second: That the defendant acted with a specific intent to commit fraud; 
Third: That the defendant mailed something (caused another person to 
mail something) for the purpose of carrying out the schcme.x5 
This jury instruction does not specifically mention the misrepresentation 
clause. However, this seems to merely be an oversight, as the Fifth Cir-
cuit has routinely held that the clauses are independent of one another. 86 
84. MM/UAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR TilE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE 
EIGHTH CIRCUT, Instruction No. 6.18.1341 (1989) (emphasis added). The First, Seventh. Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits employ jury instructions mirroring that of the Eighth Circuit. See Devitt, 
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, § 40.03 (1990). 
85. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE DISTRICT JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE FIFTH 
CIRCUIT. Instruction No. 2.54 ( 1990). 
86. For instance, in Pereira v. United States, the Supreme Colll1 lists the dements of mail 
fraud as "(I) a scheme to defraud, and (2) the mailing of a letter, etc. for the purpose of executing 
the scheme." 347 U.S. I, 8 (1954). From the language of McNally and other cases, obviously the 
courts are aware of the second prong; courts merely will include the language of the second prong 
as a different clement as the particular case demands. See generally United States v. Moser, 123 
F. 3d 813 (5th Cir.) (focusing on some scheme), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 642 ( 1997); United States 
v. Coyle, 943 F.2d 424, 427 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 461 (2d Cir. 
92 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
In part, this instruction represents a lazy shorthand that the courts often 
engage in, providing the "scheme to defraud" language and assuming that 
it includes the application of the scheme to "obtain money or property" as 
appropriate. 87 
Recognizing that the two clauses of the statute are independent, how-
ever, raises the question of whether they constitute separate offenses, and 
implicitly, whether an individual could be charged with both as separate 
crimes. Can an individual concurrently propagate fraud through both a 
scheme to defraud and a scheme to obtain property or money through 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises? While some courts 
have held that they may be presented as separate offenses,88 not all courts 
agree. 
In United States v. Goldburg,89 the defendant was charged with com-
mitting mail fraud, and the indictment included two separate counts, one 
under each clause of the statute. While not directly argued by the defen-
dant, the court discussed whether such a prosecution would be impermis-
sible under the doctrine of duplicity.90 The court felt that some dispute 
has existed concerning whether the two clauses represent different of-
fenses. The court noted that while the Tenth Circuit in Cronic held that 
they were separate offenses, other courts have adopted "the considerably 
less controversial proposition" that both types of fraud are prohibited, but 
are not necessarily different offenses.91 Using the implicit theory pre-
sented in McNally that the two clauses are "components of the same 
crime," the court did not wish to hastily "align itself with a theory that 
would allow most counts of mail fraud ... to be charged twice."92 How-
ever, the court let the conviction stand, ruling that it was no violation of 
the duplicity doctrine "for the jury to be presented with the two provi-
sions as altematives."93 
1991) (quoting the language of the statute and then condensing it into language similar to Pereira) 
Accord United States v. Quadro Corp., 928 F.Supp 688, 695 (1996), aff'd, 127 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 
1997) (focusing on a "material representation" rather than the "scheme Io defraud"). Compare 
United Stales v. Miller, 997 F.2d I 010 (2d Cir. 1993) (confusing the analysis and seemingly 
treating the two prongs as one). 
87. This may also be viewed as an attempt by courts to judicially form the statute into a 
more traditional construction, as courts often do in recognizing the substantive and jurisdictional 
elements of an offense. This analysis is problematic with mail fraud because the first prong. the 
"scheme." is fulfilled by planning, not conduct. Also, the second element is much broader than a 
mere jurisdictional qualification. See Rakoff, supra note I, at 774-76. 
88. See generally United States v. Cronic, 900 F.2d 1511, 1514 (I Oth Cir. 1990). 
89. 913 F. Supp 629 (D. Mass. 1996). 
90. "The vice of a duplicitous indictment is that it fails to notify the defendant of the 
charges. . . An indictment is duplicitous only if two offenses are alleged in the same count." !d. 
at 635-36. 
91. Id at 637 (quoting United States v. Migliaccio, 34 F.3d 1517, 1522 (lOth Cir. 1994)). 
92. ld at 638. 
93. /d. 
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V. THE FUTURE OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE: PRAGMATIC POLICIES 
For the federal prosecutor, the capability to indict under alternate 
clauses of the mail fraud statue is a powerful tool. As efforts to prosecute 
mail fraud are stepped up, newer frauds will emerge as more devious 
schemes are employed to cheat the public. Indeed, "[n]o crime is rooted 
out once and for all."94 If interpreted to bestow upon prosecutors the 
power to aver separate offenses, the two clauses of the mail fraud statute 
would constitute a forceful tool in their hands to combat new crimes as 
they develop. The absence of either a scheme to defraud or a misrepre-
sentation would then not be fatal to a prosecution. The jury, guided by the 
evidence, would simply have broader discretion to decide that the alleged 
criminal actions fall within those "evil[s] sought to be remedied."95 As it 
now stands, however, the ability to charge a separate offense under each 
clause, while manifestly an awesome power, is still a relatively uncertain 
one. 
Congress, the courts, and prosecutors should validate the ability to 
indict under alternative clauses and make it resoundingly clear that the 
power is necessary to combat ever-evolving mail fraud crime. With that 
power, federal prosecutors attempting to employ the mail fraud statute 
will be forced to consciously discern the true nature of the offending 
fraud (does the innate nature of the fraud more closely resemble a scheme 
to defraud or instead a scheme to obtain property or money through 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises?) and adduce evidence 
that would support such a prosecution. Admittedly, prosecutorial interests 
at times might favor averring the statute in a general form, 96 and broad, 
unspecific allegations may result in convictions. However, the unsettling 
results of McNally will not be replicated so swiftly if strict adherence to 
statutory purity is honored on both the part of the bar and the judiciary. 
So long as the different clauses of the statute are presented as alternatives 
rather than as conjunctive components, courts will be apt to uphold mail 
fraud convictions.97 Such a policy does not restrict the future of the mail 
fraud statute as a means of deterring fraud that would otherwise be 
unprosecutable. Rather it cements the mail fraud statute in bedrock, al-
lowing future prosecutions to build upon the past without falling subject 
94. THE QUOTABLE LAWYER ~ 35.13, at 68 (David Shrager & Elizabeth Frost eds., New 
England Publi,hing Associates 1986) (quoting TERTULLIAN, THE CHRISTIAN'S DEFENSE (c. 215)). 
95. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896). 
96. Indeed, most often courts will allow latitude as a measure of prosecutorial discretion. 
See United States v. Bract, 747 F.2d 1142, 1147 (7th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that the court uses 
a broad, not a technical standard determining the sufficiency of an indictment). 
97. See generally United States v. Goldburg, 913 F. Supp 629 (D. Mass. 1996). 
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to unsupported pitfalls such as occurred in McNally. Fraud will continue, 
each time becoming more insidious and cunning, "for the children of this 
world are in their generation wiser than the children of light."98 Only 
through a creative and malleable prosecutorial tool like the mail fraud 
statute can such fraud be regulated. 
Courts in the future must cling to a policy of consistency, maintaining 
a sharp judicial distinction between the clauses. Defiance of the clear dif-
ferences in the clauses will only further distort the legal process and cre-
ate an illegitimate child of the judiciary, formed from the illicit union of 
consanguineous statutory components. Courts must concisely dispel the 
phantomlike specters of McNally-esque jurisprudence in order to effec-
tively define the boundaries of the mail fraud statute. Only by maintain-
ing the integrity of the disjunctive barrier between the clauses can the 
courts venerate the intents of Congress while taming any unwarranted 
expansion of the statute. Such reasoning is not a clarion call for unre-
strained use of the mail fraud statute, but a summons for reason in deter-
mining its respective boundaries. Concomitantly, courts must further clar-
ify the applicability of the statute, guiding the prosecutors in their quest 
for justice. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In recent cases involving the misrepresentation branch of the mail 
fraud statute, the courts have grappled with the applicability of McNally. 
The Supreme Court never held that the two statutory clauses became in-
distinguishable: merely that their separation was not impermeable. In es-
sence, the courts now attempt to honor the Durland decision while being 
governed by McNally. The misrepresentation clause of the mail fraud 
statute was intended as an amplification of the statute; it constitutes a de-
parture from early mail fraud prosecutions. If courts were to hold that the 
two clauses were to be treated as one, then the mail fraud statute would 
become more narrow than at any time in its history. Truly, the nasty dar-
ling of the nursery would be reprimanded. However, this fate seems to 
have been at least reprieved as the Supreme Court has not since McNally 
attempted to rein in this critical prosecutorial power. 
As John Stuart Mill said: "Laws and institutions require to be 
adapted, not to good men, but to bad."99 Fraud, by its nature, adapts and 
changes. Fraud is chameleon-like, altering its appearance to the hopes 
and expectations of a naive public. As criminals become more creative, 
98. Luke 16:8 (King James). 
99. Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 289 n.64 (D. Minn. 1963) (quoting THE 
SUBJUGATION OF WOMEN (1869)). See THE QUOTABLE LAWYER supra note 94, § 36.12. at 72 
(quoting same). 
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prosecutors need a pliable instrument to implement the law. The mail 
fraud statute has provided that tool, allowing prosecutors to delve into the 
fray armed with broad statutory mandates and expansive judicial direc-
tives. While the integrity of the misrepresentation clause has been ques-
tioned in the past, post-McNally case law has supported its continued ap-
plication and autonomy. Happily, the scheme-to-defraud and misrepre-
sentation clauses still remain largely independent. Only if courts continue 
to honor and strengthen that deliniation will the mail fraud statute remain 
the true love of federal prosecutors. 
Christopher Q. Cutler 
